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Science and Intractable Conflict
Connie P. Ozawa, Ph.D.
Disagreement over the “science” is rarely the cause of intractable conflict. In
fact, if the “science” or the “facts” of the case are at the core of the conflict, it is more
likely to be resolvable. That said, scientific uncertainty, complexity and disagreement
can nonetheless prolong conflict, exacerbate poor relationships and provide a rationale
for avoiding resolution. This essay describes the role of science and other information in
intractable conflicts and suggests how intractability may be alleviated through the
strategic handling of information.
Burgess and Burgess (2003) describe intractable conflicts as “conflicts that
stubbornly seem to elude resolution, even when the best available techniques are
applied.” They go on to point out that conflicts best ought to be considered as sitting on a
continuum ranging from tractable to intractable. Examples of intractable issues include
nuclear waste disposal, abortion, and intelligent design. Religious and racial conflicts are
examples of issues at the far end of the spectrum. Decisions may be made on intractable
issues, but their implementation may be frustrated and delayed, or the decision itself may
be challenged repeatedly in various other political venues. In the case of abortion, for
example, although Roe v. Wade ensures some rights at the federal level, anti-abortionists
continue to challenge this policy in state legislatures and in the streets.
Although science may be looked to for answers in such controversies, such
expectations are misplaced. Despite the strict prescriptions regarding the accumulation of
scientific knowledge, widely known as the “scientific method,” and the rigorous scrutiny
of scientific work known as “peer review,” scientific knowledge especially at the

frontiers of knowledge where many intractable controversies are situated, is usually
partial, tentative, and rarely definitive enough to change minds.
More often in intractable conflict, science eludes a consensus. Parties may even
disagree on what constitutes valid knowledge.
Perhaps most importantly, core disagreements in intractable conflict are not
factual, but ideological or political. In order to reach an agreement, parties need to agree
on much more than what the facts are, or how they ought to be interpreted. Parties must
agree on what to do next. Complex, science-intensive conflicts require accord on the
“facts” as well as on the social goals.
Despite the widely accepted constraints of science and its social construction in
academic circles (Andrews, 2002; Fischer, 2000; Kuhn, 1962; Schraeder-Freschette,
1993), and its shared not central role in intractable conflicts, antagonists often insist on
wielding science as a shield, a weapon, or a tool of persuasion (Ozawa, 1996). When
such strategic maneuverings are allowed, conflicts rapidly deteriorate into intractability.
The controversy over the handling of nuclear waste illustrates well how science is
used in hard-to-resolve conflicts.
An Intractable Conflict
In 1978, the United States Department of Energy proposed a permanent repository
for nuclear wastes at a site about 90 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada known as
Yucca Mountain. After nearly a quarter century of vigorous public debate, the site was
finally approved by President George W. Bush in 2002. Construction began and the
facility is expected to begin receiving wastes in 2012. However, as of early 2006,
opponents, which include the state of Nevada and national environmental groups such as

the Sierra Club, have not given up the battle and have vowed to take the case all the way
up to the Supreme Court, if necessary. At the heart of the opposition are concerns about
safety at the proposed repository site.
Secretary of the Department of Energy, Spencer Abraham, recommended
approval of the Yucca Mountain site to President Bush by stating that first and foremost
of importance to him in making this recommendation was the “sound science” that
supports the location of this facility. By referencing the science, Abraham is signaling to
the president a shield to deflect public criticism.
This “sound science” is exactly the science that the state of Nevada and 70
percent of its residents (according to two polls conducted in 1998 and 2004) believe
shows that Yucca Mountain is not safe for storing the planned 77,000 tons of highly
radioactive wastes. Opponents refer to studies by both federal government and
independent scientists that suggest the site is not capable of preventing the radiation from
leaking, with lethal consequences for the environment.
The “science” is being used both as a shield and as a weapon. Whether the Yucca
Mountain site can securely contain wastes for the next 10,000 years in fact is impossible
to ascertain. In general terms, the scientific analysis of the site and future conditions
embody statistical uncertainties and methodological uncertainties, such as decisions about
the appropriateness of simplifications of phenomena, the reliability of sampling, and the
acceptability of data interpolation. More specifically, antagonists claim that predicting
geological conditions into the future is hubris; geology describes and explains past
events, not ones yet to occur. Whether Yucca Mountain’s geology will maintain its
current integrity or change in response to hydrological occurrences 10,000 or even 100

years into the future cannot be determined with certainty today. Therefore, whether this
site is a safe site or not for storing highly radioactive wastes, cannot be established by
science.
Although safety of the proposed repository is one of the focal points of the current
controversy, it is more likely a surrogate for other, more philosophical and moral
concerns, such as whether one state ought to bear the risks for the many others who
reaped the benefits of nuclear electricity generation, or whether ensuring waste disposal
will encourage continued or increasing reliance on nuclear power.
Contenders in intractable conflict exploit scientific uncertainty (and complexity)
to generate support for their own positions or attack opposing ones, despite the fact that
no amount of “sound science” will resolve the differences between them. Science is used
as a tactical tool for garnering public support and influencing decision makers.
In another example, the 2001 Bush Administration’s attempt to reverse more
stringent standards for arsenic in drinking water evoked classic comments. Albuquerque
major Jim Baca was quoted in The New York Times as saying, “What we would like is
some definitive scientific evidence that this would be worth doing.” In contrast,
Representative Tom Udall astutely lamented, “There’s been this refrain, whenever people
don’t want tighter environmental standards, they say there is no sound science” (Egan,
2001).
Other Factors Related to Science That Escalate Conflict
Science, or knowledge gained through execution of the scientific method and peer
reviewed to ensure rigor, is not universally accepted as the only way, or even the best
way, of knowing about the world. Beyond the methodological limits noted above, a

reductionist approach is counter to a holistic and interconnected understanding.
Increasingly, the need to integrate knowledge from diverse scientific disciplines is
recognized as necessary and desirable among scientists and non-scientists alike.
Moreover, at a societal level, lay observations, experience, and commonsense
knowledge that are gained through day-to-day interactions with a place over years may
be as valuable as knowledge gained through formal science. Often serving as the basis
for the perceptions and perspectives of non-scientists, failure to reconcile “local
knowledge” with formal science may prolong debates, damage relationships and lead to
intractable conflict and human tragedies. The struggle of residents in Woburn, MA to
convince regulators of the deadly effects of decades of toxic dumping that contaminated
the town’s wells (Haar, 1995) and the lengthy battle by Lois Gibbs and her neighbors to
win recognition of the deathly conditions at Love Canal (Layzer, 2006) are wellpublicized examples of a lay population’s efforts to gain legitimacy within legal and
administrative structures that privilege formal scientific methods and those with
appropriate credentials over commonsense methods of data collection and analysis. Fatal
exposures may have been prevented and remedial actions instituted earlier had
government regulators accepted more readily the residents’ intuition and observations
about their environments.
Finally, mishandling science can fuel mistrust that can aggravate relationships and
prolong conflict. Adding oil to an already heated debate over Yucca Mountain, United
States Geological Society (USGS) hydrologists admitted that they had fabricated facts in
developing an infiltration model on which DOE decisions to move facility construction
forward had been based. When evidence of this malfeasance surfaced, the Department of

Energy moved quickly to reevaluate the analysis. Not surprisingly, but also not
convincingly, DOE announced that the original conclusions were sound (Werner, 2006).
The damage was costly in terms of erosion of reputation and public trust, and the battle to
shut down Yucca Mountain before it opens continues (Pegg, 2006).
Using Science Wisely
Addressing the use of information in conflict is important because failure to do so
can pave the way for adversarial uses of science. Discounting sources of knowledge can
be interpreted as disrespect and demeaning, and can erode trust. Poor relationships can
push conflict down the spectrum toward intractability.
Given the limitations of what we can know at any given time, especially in high
stakes issues that project into the unpredictable future, can science and other forms of
knowledge be integrated artfully into discussions to facilitate agreement, to move
conflicts down the scale away from “intractable” and towards “tractable”?
Over the years, we have learned a few things about what works best and when.
Anticipating the strategic uses of science noted above (as a weapon, a shield, or simply a
delay tactic), the sooner procedures are put in place to create a joint understanding of the
“facts” of a case, the less likely such details will contribute to embittered relationships or
push the conflict toward intractability. Early prevention avoids the development of
suspicion and distrust.
First, participants involved in conflict surround complex issues should be urged to
focus on the facts that matter. In our information-rich times, participants can be
overwhelmed easily by data and studies that relate tangentially to the many issues at
hand. What sorts of information are most relevant to the participants in the shaping of

their understanding of current conditions, likely future conditions, and their preferred
course of action? What sorts of information are most relevant to what participants care
most about? In other words, what questions must be answered in order for participants to
comfortably begin discussions about what to do next? By narrowing discussions to the
information that participants care about, the facts that matter can be assembled, sorted
and comprehended more easily.
Second, how can participants best understand the facts that matter? Can we value
both the work of scientists and their elaborate computer models and the knowledge
gained by residents living in a place over generations? Do hydrological models provide
the best information about whether urban streams will flood into residents’ yards and
homes? Or do site-specific individual recordings of historical precedents (such as the
water line on Grandpa’s barn post) offer a more accurate guide? Can we put these facts
together as complementary information rather than contradictory or competing? In fact,
due to land use changes that have occurred since the big flood of Grandpa’s generation,
hydrological conditions may have changed dramatically and the barn post data may no
longer be relevant. On the other hand, such data may augment formal data bases which
are often limited to sampling and vulnerable to the methodological uncertainty mentioned
earlier. Recognition of the usefulness and limits of all sources of knowledge as part of a
joint effort to assess conditions is not only an important step toward defusing the
incendiary potential of contradictory understandings. It is also an opportunity for
demonstrating mutual respect for participants with different sources and sorts of
knowledge.

Finally, participants should collectively and publicly acknowledge the persistence
of scientific uncertainty. The mythical quest for “definitive scientific evidence” allows
parties to avoid committing to action. When parties together recognize the limits of
certainty, scientific and otherwise, they can then set about placing boundaries around the
uncertainty and creating a range of probable futures. A good example of this occurred in
an early Environmental Protection Regulatory regulatory negotiation. Clean air advocates
and the wood stoves industry did not agree on the appropriate wood stove emission levels
that would result in acceptable air quality. They did concur, however, on a reasonable
range of likely figures and in order to reach an agreement decided to stagger
implementation of more rigorous standards over time. By doing so, the industry was
willing to accept lower emission levels in the longer term in exchange for more lax
standards, or higher levels, initially. In actuality, the industry did not contest that lower
emission levels would result in higher air quality. However, the need to prevent approval
of more stringent standards until their production line could be re-tooled would have
provided an incentive for the industry to exploit the uncertainty in prediction
methodologies (Ozawa, 1991). By acknowledging and working with the range of
uncertainty in the predictive model, the participants were able to reach an agreement
rather than continue to disagree and delay any action.
Practitioners and scholars have examined carefully how information can best be
integrated into decision maker to facilitate agreement and have developed advice for
handling information in controversial cases based on both theory and practice (Adler et
al, 2001; Ozawa, 2005). The application of this advice is dependent on the context and
conditions pertaining to specific conflicts. As noted early on in this article, whether a

conflict is intractable or not depends largely on non-scientific or non-factual matters.
Nonetheless, the following points can help avoid science-intensive conflicts from moving
down the continuum to intractability.
•

Parties to a conflict should commit to regular dissemination of information
in highly accessible formats.

•

Workshops, panels, and other opportunities to disclose and explain
discretionary elements of research, data and analysis should be scheduled
regularly, as needed.

•

Technical expertise should be made available to all parties.

•

Participants and decision makers involved should publicly acknowledge
the incomplete state of knowledge and their openness to receiving
information that is “surprising,” or that does not conform to their prior
conceptions.

•

When differences arise between or among different expert advisors, a
public airing should be held to clarify the basis for the discrepancies.

•

Participants should look for ways to create opportunities for short-term
decisions that can be reviewed at a later date, for example, after additional
information becomes available.

•

Ongoing monitoring and data collection according to agreed upon
protocols should be put in place to develop confidence in agreed upon
actions and to allow for adjustments if necessary.

Sharing information and knowledge, scientific and of other sorts, should be
conducted early and often in forms accessible and ingestible by all. Generally, this
approach is called “joint fact-finding,” but the points above delineate specific objectives
and procedures. When the “science” or basic “facts about the case” become the focal
point of a dispute, a mediator must work to disengage parties from their espoused
positions. Underscoring the partial and tentative nature of science, and the inherent
uncertainties of predictive sciences in a public manner is one way to do this.
Burgess and Burgess (2003) remind us that intractability is caused by
“irreconcilable moral differences, high-stakes distribution issues and domination or
“pecking order” conflicts.” Because one’s perception of reality may affects one’s moral
stance and sense of what is possible in terms of distribution of benefits or harms, science,
or “what the facts” are, undeniably comes into play. However, the role of science is more
of a “supporting prop” rather a leading actor.
The case of global warming and greenhouse gases is perhaps a leading
contemporary example of the extent to which “the science” can help frustrate efforts to
reach agreement on complex, seemingly intractable conflict. Despite more than a decade
of a growing consensus among the world’s leading climatologists and meteorologists, the
Bush White House continues to be uninterested in taking action to reduce carbon
emissions to temper rising global temperatures. Apparently, no amount of scientific
evidence will persuade the Administration to sign the Kyoto Protocol. The battle is
ideological and political, about distributional gains and losses and philosophical and
moral compulsions. The decision to sign an international agreement to curtail global

disaster is not centered on science. As is unfortunately all too often the case, it is
unlikely that the best conflict resolution techniques will shift this intractable conflict.

References

Adler, P. S., Barrett, R.C., Bean, M.C., Birkhoff, J.E., Ozawa, C.P. and Rudin, E.B.
Managing Scientific and Technical Information in Environmental Cases:
Principles and Practices for Mediators and Facilitators. Monograph sponsored
by RESOLVE, Inc., U.S. Institute for Environmental Conflict Resolution, and
Western Justice Center Foundation, 2000.
Andrews, C. Humble Analysis: The Practice of Joint Fact-Finding. Westport,
Connecticut: Praeger, 2002.
Burgess, G. M. and Burgess, H. “What Are Intractable Conflicts?” Beyond Intractability.
In Burgess G. and Burgess, H. (ed) Conflict Research Consortium, University of
Colorado, Boulder. Posted: November 2003.
http://www.beyondintractabiltiy.org/m/meaning_intractabilty.jsp. Accessed
January 7, 2006.
Egan, T. “In New Mexico, Debate Over Arsenic Strikes Home,” The New York Times,
April 14, 2001, p. 1, col. 1.
Fischer, F. Citizens, Experts, and the Environment: The Politics of Local Knowledge.
Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2000.
Haar, J. A Civil Action. New York: Random House, 1995.
Kuhn, T. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1962.
Layzer, J. A. The Environmental Case: Translating Values into Policy. (2nd ed.)
Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2006.

Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, U.S. Department of Energy. .
Accessed 2-22-06.
Ozawa, C.P. Recasting Science: Consensual Procedures in Public Policy Making.
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991.
------------. “Science in Environmental Conflicts." Sociological Perspectives, 39(2): 219230, 1996. Also reprinted in Environmental Sociology: from Analysis to Action,
King, L. and McCarthy, D. (eds.), Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005.
------------. “Putting Science in Its Place,” In J.T. Scholz, J.T. and B. Stiftel, (eds.)
Adaptive Governance and Water Conflict: New Institutions for Collaborative
Planning. Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 2005.
Pegg. J.R. “US Forges Ahead With Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste Dump,”
http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/mar2006/2006-03-02-10.asp . Accessed
February 2, 2006.
Scholz, J. and Stiftel, B. Adaptive Governance and Water Conflict: New Institutions for
Collaborative Planning. Shrader-Frechette, K.S. Burying Uncertainty: Risk and
the Case Against Geological Disposal of Nuclear Waste. Berkeley and Los
Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1993.
Sierra Club. “Hazardous Nuclear Waste Coming to a Road or Rail-Line Near You;
Senate Approves Nuclear Waste Storage Facility at Yucca Mountain.”
http://www.commondreams.org/news2002/0709-12.htm. Accessed February 22,
2006.

Werner, E. Associate Press, “Work on Yucca Mountain nuclear dump ok, but will be
redone.” The Boston Globe, February 18, 2006.
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2006/02/18/work_on_yucca_mountai
n_nuclear_dump_ok_but_will_be_redone/. Accessed February 22, 2006.

Author Identification
Connie P. Ozawa, Ph.D., is a Professor of Urban Studies and Planning at Portland State
University. She is author of Recasting Science: Consensual Procedures in Public Policy
Making (Westview Press, 1991), and several articles on scientific and other information
in public decision making.

